This paper calculates monthly time series for the overall safety net's statutory marginal labor income tax rate as a function of skill and marital status. Marginal tax rates increased significantly for all groups between 2007 and 2009, and dramatically so for unmarried household heads. The relationship between incentive changes and skill varies by marital status. Unemployment insurance and related expansions contribute to the patterns by skill while food stamp expansions contribute to the patterns by marital status. Remarkably, group changes in hours worked per capita line up with the statutory measures of incentive changes.
The economy experienced an unusually deep and prolonged contraction, especially in its labor markets. Employment and hours worked fell during 2008 and 2009 for many demographic groups, but disproportionately so among less skilled people, and among the unmarried. As of 2012, labor market activity still remained far below pre-recession levels. Over the same time frame, many facets of fiscal policy were changed, especially policies related to the distribution of safety net program benefits.
Fiscal policymakers were of course watching the economy closely, and major safety net legislation was certainly a reaction to economic conditions. But unless behavior is completely unresponsive to tax and benefit formulas, we cannot have a full understanding of the relationship between fiscal policy and the economy without quantifying marginal tax rates, their changes over time, and their differences across demographic groups. The purpose of this paper is to help examine the labor market impacts of recent changes in safety net programs by measuring time series of implicit marginal labor income tax rates for the safety net as a whole and recognizing that marginal tax rates and their changes vary by demographic group. In this regard, the paper is a longitudinal version of prior studies appearing in Tax Policy and the Economy that showed how implicit marginal income tax rates vary with household income and other characteristics under a single year's tax and benefit rules. 1 Analysis of implicit marginal tax rates and their differences across groups might seem to be a specialized topic of poverty research, and only relevant for macroeconomic analysis to the extent that the economy is populated by poor people. However, this paper explains how people from the middle and above-middle parts of the skill distribution can become eligible overnight for safety net programs such as unemployment insurance and now SNAP (formerly known as food stamps) merely by becoming unemployed for a period of time. Thus, even skilled people have their incentives to seek and retain work determined in part by safety net program rules. This paper shows that wide swaths of the skill distribution saw their marginal tax rates increase by more than five percentage points in less than two years.
I consider the entire safety net, as well as payroll and income taxes, but give most of my attention to three programs spending the largest amounts on non-elderly households, and with significant legislative changes: unemployment insurance, SNAP (formerly known as food stamps), and Medicaid.
2 I focus on the non-elderly population because the elderly have access to a different set of safety net programs and have a different (and weaker) relationship with the labor market.
My marginal tax rate concept is a comparison of the total amount of subsidies net of taxes received if and when a person were not working to the total amount received (or paid) if and when the same person were working full time, expressed as a fraction of the amount produced when working full time. This measure is a marginal tax rate on the decision margin of working full time or not at all during a specific time interval. In this regard, my tax rate concept is reminiscent of the implicit tax rates used by Gruber and Wise (1999) and collaborators in their "tax force" measures of the retirement incentives created by public pension and disability programs around the world. The relationship between subsidies received when not working and the amount that could be earned when working full time varies by demographic group. A number of subsidies are set as specific dollar amounts (such as the SNAP maximum benefit, or the maximum unemployment insurance benefit), or as a specific bundle of services (as with Medicaid) regardless of how much the beneficiary might earn if he worked full time. Unemployment insurance benefits below the maximum are, on the other hand, specified as a proportion of the amounts earned in prior employment.
2 Because subsidy program participation is voluntary, a subsidy cannot have a large effect on incentives or behavior unless it redistributes a significant amount of resources. A tax program, on the other hand, can in principle create large marginal tax rates without redistributing much revenue. 3 My tax rate is equivalent to a weighted average of (one minus) the local slopes of a worker's budget constraint (in a graph of disposable income versus earnings from work), where the weights are the size of the income interval over which each local slope applies, because my tax rate is one minus the slope of the straight line connecting the no work point of the budget set to the full-time work point. In this regard, some might say that my tax rate measures "extensive margin" incentives, which are a weighted average of "intensive margin" incentives. However, readers should recognize that the concepts of intensive and extensive margins have a time dimension, which varies across studies and safety net programs. For example, the decision whether to work in the month of August is an extensive margin decision from the point of view of a program that monitors beneficiaries' labor income on a monthly basis, but an intensive margin decision from the point of view of a program such as the Earned Income Tax Credit that monitors income on a calendar year basis (unless not working in all of the other eleven months of that year).
Subsidies received by both employed and non-employed people also depend on the income of others in the household, and therefore can vary significantly by marital status. Finally, subsidy rules have changed over time as new legislation was passed, and calendar time triggered new provisions in old legislation. This paper therefore calculates marginal tax rates as a function of earnings potential, marital status, and calendar time.
The paper begins with its conceptual framework for measuring work incentives implicit in the composite of programs known as the safety net, with emphasis on isolating groups-specific changes over time that come from changes in safety net program rules rather than changes in the behavior of the population served under a fixed set of rules. I then identify the changes in safety net eligibility and benefit rules that were significant for the non-elderly population. The paper concludes with marginal tax rate series that combine the program-by-program results of earlier sections and a first indication of how changes in these rates were correlated with labor market behavior.
One point of view is that the labor market is slack during a recession, that as a consequence labor supply has nothing to do with labor market outcomes, and that household marginal tax rate calculations are of no help in understanding how people behave during recessions. Even if this conception of slack markets were accurate, marginal tax rate changes are relevant because they tell us where the labor market is headed after it is no longer slack and supply incentives start to matter again. More important, both theory and evidence might support the opposite point of view: that subsidies for the unemployed and the poor matter as much or more during a period of significant labor market distortions, in part because those subsidies loom large relative to low offer wages. 4 This conclusion of this paper also presents a puzzle for the theory that labor supply has recently been irrelevant: that 2007-10 changes in work hours per capita correlate so closely across demographic groups with statutory changes in the incentives to work.
A Framework for Relating the Entire Safety Net to the Reward for Working An Index Number Approach
Consider for a moment a specific homogeneous demographic group g whose members'
labor supply decision consists only of the decision of whether to work full time during, say, a month t, or not to work at all. The financial reward to working during that interval depends on, among other things, the probability that each member would be eligible for, and willing to participate in, the various safety net programs if and when he were not working, and the value of benefits that would be received from each program when participating and not working.
Because both the probability and the value depend on program rules that change over time, my approach begins by forming two time series for each safety net program j and demographic group g: a statutory eligibility index series {E gjt } and a statutory benefit-per-participant index series {B gjt }. The indices change only at dates t when new program rules ("statutes") go into effect. A time series for demographic group g's overall statutory safety net generosity {b gt } is obtained by aggregating the product of the two indices across programs using a set of timeinvariant participation weights  gj . 
where g indexes demographic groups, j indexes safety net programs, and t indexes calendar time.
In principle, the formula (1) can include any number of subsidy and tax programs with any number of rule changes over time. 5 This paper considers only unemployment insurance and related programs, SNAP, and the payroll tax, plus time-invariant eligibility and benefit indices for Medicaid, the personal income tax, for all other anti-poverty programs combined, and for debt discharges. In practice, demographic groups are not homogeneous. For example, some of the unemployed quit their jobs, and others were laid off. I interpret the product  gj E gjt as average program j participation among non-employed members of group g under month t program rules.
Also note that the participation weight  gj is constant over time, so that changes over time in group g's composition have no effect on its overall statutory safety net generosity index. Only program rule changes cause the index to change over time, which is why I refer to it as a "statutory index."
The benefit index B gjt measures the average dollar received from program j by non- The calculations in this paper could in principle be made for any amount of earnings potential, and at more than five points in the distribution. I choose these five points because they systematically cover a fairly wide range of earnings and because they facilitate matching the ten groups to specific demographic characteristics so that labor market behavior and especially program participation can be estimated separately for the ten groups.
In order to match earnings potential amounts with specific demographic characteristics, I
used the full-time employed household heads and spouses aged 26-64 respondents to Current For laid-off workers who wanted to remain on their former employer's health plan, the ARRA offered to pay 65 percent of the cost. For a $13,027 annual family health insurance premium (Crimmel 2010) , that subsidy is worth $706 per month. However, I estimate that the number of people receiving the benefit when it was available was only one-fifth the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, so the effect of the COBRA provision on the index is only $143 per month (see Mulligan (2012) ).
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The remainder of the UI benefit events relates to expirations of the ARRA provisions.
Two of the provisions were grandfathered: that is, continuing unemployed persons would continue benefits under each provision, but new unemployed persons were not able to participate. In those cases, I stepped down the benefit index by half when the grandfathering begins and by the other half when the program ends entirely.
13 Figure 1 shows the UI benefit index time series for each of the five levels of potential earnings. The vertical axis measures the index as a ratio to potential earnings, as it appears in the marginal tax rate formula (more on this below). Before and after the ARRA, four of the five groups had a benefit index equal to 44 percent of their potential earnings because they were receiving only the base benefit and it was below the cap. The highest potential earnings group has its base benefit at the cap, and therefore has a replacement rate less than 44 percent. Benefit indices are greater during the ARRA by dollar amounts that are the same for all five groups, and therefore lesser fractions of potential earnings for higher potential groups. This ARRA-UI effect 11 The average marginal federal income tax rate in 2009 was 21 percent for wage income (National Bureau of Economic Research 2010). $57 per month = 0.21*2400*1.001/9, where the 1.001 is the conversion from March 2010 (a typical month to receive tax year 2009 tax refunds) prices to fiscal year 2010 prices. 12 COBRA refers to the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act, which is the statute under which laid-off employees have the option to continue on their former employer's health insurance plan. Because I use the same participation weight for all of the unemployment insurance and related provisions, the contribution of the ARRA's COBRA subsidy to the UI benefit index must be adjusted for differential participation in UI and the COBRA subsidy. Equivalently, the COBRA subsidy could be included in the model (1) as a separate program with its own participation weight. 13 In the case of UI-FAC, the benefit is nominal so the initial inflation-adjusted step down is a bit more than half. Table 1 's second row is 75 percent of the average maximum benefit in September 2007 (the last month before the first SNAP benefit event), converted to constant dollars.
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I assume that participating unmarried household heads obtain the maximum SNAP benefit for their household when not working. Whether they obtain a benefit when working full time depends on the amount they would earn. The middle and above-median potential earnings amounts put essentially all households above 130 percent of federal poverty guidelines, regardless of household size. In these cases, the entire maximum SNAP benefit is lost as a consequence of working full time rather than not working at all. For September 2007, this is the $314 amount shown in the final two entries of Table 1 's third row.
The two below-median potential earnings amounts are small enough relative to the maximum benefit that larger households would still obtain a SNAP benefit if the unmarried household head were working full time, in which case the benefit lost from working full time is about 30 percent of potential earnings rather than the full maximum benefit.
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The corresponding entries in Table 1 's third row are a weighted average of 30 percent of potential earnings and the maximum benefit, with weights based on the propensity of full-time employed household heads and spouses in 2007 with earnings near to the potential shown in Table 1 to have a maximum SNAP benefit corresponding to their household size that is less than 30 percent of their earnings.
I identified significant changes in SNAP benefit rules by reviewing various editions of the USDA's Characteristics of Food Stamp Households and Characteristics of Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program Households. The three major SNAP benefit events were all maximum benefit increases. Their inflation-unadjusted amounts are shown in the bottom panel of Table 1 . In addition, the inflation-adjusted SNAP benefit changes every month with inflation, because the maximum benefit is not adjusted for inflation in between benefit events. Figure 2 shows the SNAP benefit index time series for the various demographic groups.
Its vertical axis is measured in constant dollars per month in order to simplify the presentation of the ten groups. The five married groups have the same benefit index because all of them receive zero SNAP benefit when working full time, and all receive the same amount below the SNAP maximum benefit when either head or spouse is not working. The top three or four unmarried groups have similar benefit indices (to each other) because each is receiving the SNAP maximum benefit when not working and essentially no benefit when working. The unmarried group with the least potential earnings has a lesser benefit index (in constant dollars) because it still receives a significant SNAP benefit when working full time. All of the unmarried groups have their index increase by the same dollar amount at the event dates due to the SNAP maximum benefit changes; married group changes are 75 percent (see above). In between event dates, general inflation or deflation change every index by the same proportion.
The Medicaid programs do not gradually phase out benefits with income, 17 but rather have discrete income eligibility points, below which otherwise eligible persons receive the full benefit and above which no benefits are received. The income eligibility points vary by program (there are different points for children than for adults) and by state, but for simplicity my calculations assume a single income threshold at 130 percent of the federal poverty guideline. The middle and above-median potential earnings amounts put essentially all households above 130 percent of federal poverty guidelines, regardless of household size. In these cases, the entire maximum Medicaid benefit is lost as a consequence of working full time even if the person is an unmarried household head. Thus, the same $358 from the married Medicaid row of Table 1 also appears in the right-hand entries of the unmarried Medicaid row.
The two below-median potential earnings amounts are small enough relative to the maximum benefit that larger households would still obtain the full Medicaid benefit if the unmarried household head were working full time, in which case there is no Medicaid benefit lost from working full time. The corresponding entries in (Eslami, Filion and Strayer 2011) . 19 The Medicaid participation rate also reflects the possibility that the household might have more than one Medicaid participant, and that in-kind benefits are worth less than cash benefits. earnings near to the potential shown in Table 1 to have earnings that exceed 130 percent of the federal poverty guideline corresponding to their household size.
The "other means tested government programs" category contributes a real dollar amount to the overall benefit index that is constant over time and across groups, and is taken from Mulligan's (2012) the ten percent is net of any income tax owed on safety net benefits received when not working or any safety net benefits received through the income tax system. 21 The only change in payroll 20 Because I am calculating incentives for individuals, the equilibrium incidence of the tax is irrelevant -i.e., whether it is ultimately borne by employers or employees -because either way it creates a wedge between the supply and demand prices of labor. More important is whether the payroll tax is really a marginal tax rather than a user fee whose payments confer benefits on the payer (Feldstein and Samwick 1992) . Note that the 2011 payroll tax cut did not affect social security benefits, so the entire payroll tax rate change is in fact a marginal tax rate cut (for persons earning under the earnings limit of about $110,000 per year). 21 A household head or spouse who is not working during, say, a quarter, typically has worked during some or all of the other three quarters of the year and might therefore qualify for the earned income tax credit despite not working during the quarter.
and income tax rules I find to be significant for the purpose of quantifying marginal tax rates is the two percentage point cut in the payroll tax effective January 2011, which is shown as the last benefit event in Table 1 .
The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act created or changed three federal individual income tax credits: the Making Work Pay Tax Credit, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Additional Child Tax Credit. All three of the changes are credited with reducing poverty (Sherman 2011) , which by itself suggests that, if anything, they reduced work incentives for the median household head or spouse who normally is not in poverty. Mulligan (2012) explains further why these tax credit changes did not significantly reduce marginal tax rates at the median, but more work is needed to determine the size of their effects on marginal tax rates for the lowest potential earnings group featured in this paper.
Eligibility Rule Changes
In order to identify significant changes in UI eligibility, I further reviewed the U.S. Labor (2011) . It, and the sources therein, cited four significant UI eligibility rule changes between January 2007 and December 2011, three of which related to the maximum duration of time that benefits could be collected. They are summarized in my Table 2 . Table 2 also displays the expansion factor for each eligibility rule change, which is the ratio of the eligibility index at the date indicated to its value in the previous month. For an eligibility rule change that involves extending the duration of UI benefits from A weeks to B weeks, the relative population size is measured by the ratio of the fraction (measured for 2007 and 2010, and then averaged) of unemployed persons aged 25-64 whose spell has not yet surpassed B weeks to the fraction of unemployed persons aged 25-64 whose spell has not yet surpassed A weeks. Because I find the distribution of unemployment spells to be similar for the potential earnings quintiles, I use the same UI eligibility index for all of the ten groups. States help administer the SNAP program and have been changing their eligibility rules, petitioning the federal government to waive some of its eligibility rules, and otherwise making it easier and more attractive for the poor to participate (Eslami, Filion and Strayer 2011, 11) .
Department's Chronology of Federal Unemployment Compensation Laws
During fiscal years 2007-2011 at least twenty-seven states, plus the District of Columbia, adopted "broad-based categorical eligibility," which means that states confer automatic SNAP eligibility on all households receiving a specified social service informational brochure. as they typically were before the recession began.
As with the UI program, I assume that the same SNAP eligibility index time series applies to all demographic groups, and therefore use the series contained in Mulligan's (2012) calculation of a single marginal tax rate series for the "average marginal worker." This assumption does not rule out the possibility that eligibility rule changes alone create marginal tax rate and participation changes that vary by demographic group, because the benefit indices and program participation weights in this paper vary by group.
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The SNAP eligibility series increases by a factor of 1. Recall that the program participation weights reflect the propensity of the various demographic groups to be eligible for and take up the program. 24 As explained by Mulligan (2012) , the SNAP eligibility index change is based on the size of the populations affected by various SNAP eligibility rule changes and on cross-state and cross-group estimates of the relationship between SNAP participation levels and changes and various eligibility criteria. The change in the SNAP eligibility index is significantly less than the change over the same time frame in the propensity of poor people to participate in SNAP.
Aggregating Programs to Obtain Safety Net Marginal Tax Rates Program Participation Weights
The benefit amounts shown in Table 1 Interestingly, the propensity to receive UI when unemployed is highest for the middle quintile (76 percent), and lowest for the lowest potential earnings quintile (55 percent).
Because work hours can change on three margins -movements between employment and unemployment, movements between employment and out of the labor force, and reductions in hours among the employed -the UI participation weight needs a final component for the purpose of quantifying incentives to supply hours because UI benefits are typically not paid to persons out of the labor force or to employed persons with reduced hours. I take this factor to be 0.58, which is the unemployment change share of the decomposition of the 2007-2010 change in per capita hours worked among non-elderly household heads and spouses.
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The resulting participation weights are multiplied by the UI eligibility index (common to the ten groups) and shown in Figure 3 . The lowest potential earnings group has the lowest index in Figure 3 because it has the lowest average UI participation among those unemployed no more than 26 weeks. The median and median plus 0.2 log potential earnings group have the highest index in the figure because they had the highest average UI participation. Each of the indices has its greatest increase in mid-2008, because that is when the duration of UI eligibility was extended from 26 to 52 and thereby impacted the greatest fraction of unemployed people. In contrast, the last increase at the end of 2009 is the smallest, despite the significant press coverage given to the 99 week limit, because only two percent of the unemployed have spells lasting so far more than 72 weeks (the limit before December 2009) and less than 96 weeks. In other words, holding behavior constant, extending benefit duration from 72 to 96 delivers far fewer dollars to the unemployed population than extending it from 26 to 52 and therefore has a far lesser effect on average marginal tax rates.
Because SNAP is based on household income, I estimate SNAP participation weights separately for married and unmarried people, and separately for persons unemployed and out-ofthe-labor-force. For each of these four groups (marital status by labor force status), I take the ratio of the average number of group members in a SNAP household during a month of the fiscal year 2010 to the weekly average nationwide total number of group members. The numerators are measured from the USDA's fiscal year 2010 quality control file and the denominators from 27 That is, 58 percent of the reduction in work hours per capita was due to increased unemployment per capita during the CPS survey reference week. Nine percent was increased out-of-the-labor-force per capita. 33 percent was reduced hours work among the employed. The decomposition's interaction term was negligible (Mulligan 2012) . underemployed, which is 0.946. I then discount the result by 50 percent to reflect the fact that 28 In doing so, I give reduced hours the same weight as unemployed, because both create some income for the SNAP participant that would be considered in the SNAP benefit formula. Results turn out to be insensitive to the 0.09 and 0.91 weights used in the average. 29 Although this result is not surprising for the reasons cited above, I checked it in the 2008 CPS-ADF by regressing reported 2007 SNAP participation on a constant, marital status, and 2007 annual earnings relative to federal poverty guidelines (truncated left and right at 0 and 5, respectively) in the sample of household heads and spouses aged 25-64 in 2007. At the sample mean earnings ratio, the regression's predicted SNAP participation rate was 5 times greater for the unmarried than for the married. 30 Two thirds of non-elderly unmarried household heads who were out of the labor force were in SNAP households. 31 The relative dollar amounts of support from the two programs depends on skill level because, holding family composition constant, SNAP benefits are a fixed dollar amount and UI benefits vary with earnings on the prior job. At the median skill level, UI benefit dollars are three or four times SNAP's. For the lowest skill group, UI dollars are about double SNAP dollars.
Medicaid benefits are distributed in-kind, rather than in cash or cash equivalents, because the effect of benefits on the incentive to work depends on their value to the beneficiary rather than their cost to the government. I use the CPS-ADF to estimate the Medicaid participation rates among married unemployed household heads and spouses aged 25-64 relative to unmarried unemployed household heads aged 25-64 in order to form marital-status-specific weights from the aggregate weight of 0.47: 0.63 for the unmarried and 0.35 for the married.
Marginal Tax Rate Results
I calculate a marginal tax rate series for each group by taking the sum (1) over all programs, and groups of programs, shown in Table 1 and dividing by potential earnings inclusive of fringes, as in equation (2).
Potential earnings inclusive of fringes is calculated as the product of potential cash earnings (the monthly amounts $2,110, $2,578, etc. shown in Table 1 Marginal tax rates are greater for unmarried people than for married people at the same potential earnings. Holding marital status constant, marginal tax rates are greatest for the 32 Because of the number of components in the calculation, many of the results are not particularly sensitive to reasonable changes in any one of the components. Mulligan (2012) presents a detailed sensitivity analysis for the average marginal worker (something like the married and middle-potential income group shown in this paper), and finds that the most important parameter (for the purpose of time series analysis -cross-group comparisons are not examined) is the 58% weight given to hours reductions due to unemployment rather than out-of-the-labor force or hours among employees.
second-to-lowest earnings potential group, because that group has the least earnings potential among groups with little or no SNAP and Medicaid eligibility when working full time. The lowest earnings potential group's marginal tax rate is not especially high despite its small denominator because many of its members can participate in Medicaid and SNAP regardless of how much they work.
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The left half of Table 3 Because each marginal tax rate is calculated as a cross-program sum (see equation (1) changes in UI eligibility associated with the duration of benefits, changes in UI eligibility associated with the modernization of the program, changes in UI and related benefits (such as the 33 The marginal tax rate's numerator is the difference between the total amount of subsidies net of taxes received if and when a person does not work and the total amount received (or paid) if and when the same person were working full time: the causal effect of (not) working on subsidies net of taxes. The lowest skill group has a relatively small causal effect of working on net subsidies because they receive many of the subsidies even when working full time. See also Yelowitz (1995) . 34 The two percentage point payroll tax cut is only 1.6 percentage points when the base is earnings plus fringes.
COBRA subsidy for unemployed people), changes in SNAP eligibility and benefit rules, and all other eligibility and benefit rule changes. 
where  denotes the time difference operator (between 2007 and 2010, or between 2007 and 2011) . Although the marginal tax rate levels depend on all safety net programs, marginal tax rate changes are calculated merely from programs with changing benefit and eligibility rules. Prior to 2014, these are only UI, SNAP, and the payroll tax, which is why those are the only terms appearing in equation (3). The first set of curly brackets show terms relating to changes in UI eligibility and benefit rules. For these purposes, the UI eligibility index has been decomposed into the product of two eligibility indices relating to (benefit) "duration" and "modernization."
The final term in the first set of curly brackets quantifies the effect of changing UI benefits conditional on eligibility. The second-to-last row of equation (3) is the combined contribution of changes in SNAP eligibility and benefit rules. The final term relates to the change in the payroll tax rate, which is zero prior to 2011, and interactions between the various UI change terms. In other words, the combined effect of the payroll tax and extended UI benefits is to raise marginal tax rates, even for (some) persons with above-median earning potential. 
Conclusions, and a Cross-Group Comparison of Incentives and Labor Market Behavior
It is recognized, especially in poverty research, that program rules changed for a number of safety net programs in the direction of providing more assistance for the poor, unemployed, and financially distressed. It is also recognized that helping poor people has a cost in terms of incentives. For any one of the program rule changes, the effect on incentives seems small, but the greatest surprises in this paper's results are the large sum total of those incentive changes, even when accounting for imperfect take-up, and how different they are by marital status.
The right half of Table 3 Not too long ago, economists believed that the reward to working affects the amount that people work. They debated the exact magnitude of this effect, but largely agreed that incentive changes of the magnitude shown in Table 3 would noticeably depress the quantity of labor.
Even for readers who believe that supply incentives are temporarily irrelevant while the labor market is "slack" and monetary policy seems ineffective, it may still seem unlikely that the labor market could return to its 2007 amounts of activity as long as incentives remain so much less. In this regard, it may be no puzzle that the labor market has so far recovered only a fraction of its 2008-9 decline: the incentives to work have so far recovered only a fraction of their decline.
More work needs to be done to understand the 2007-2010 labor market experiences of different demographic groups. This paper provides one ingredient for that analysis: separate marginal tax rate series by potential income and by marital status. Figure 7 offers a preview of such an analysis by comparing the ten group's incentive changes from Table 3 having lesser hours and incentive changes, but is perhaps unsurprising because less skilled groups are known to have more cyclical work (Solon, Barsky and Parker 1994) . However, it is interesting that the hours-change variation across skill groups is less among married people: a labor supply theory might explain this as a consequence of less incentive-change variation. In fact, there is simultaneously very little hours change variation across the bottom four married skill groups and very little incentive change variation.
More surprising is that, holding skill constant (as measured by the amount actually earned in 2005-7 by full-time working persons in the various groups), hours changes are so different for unmarried people at or below median earnings potential. For example, per capita work hours fell 9 percent among unmarried household heads with earnings potential of about $3,100 per month, whereas they fell only 6 percent for married household heads and spouses with the same earnings potential and fell only 6 percent for married household heads and spouses with even less earnings potential. Perhaps dramatic incentive changes are a significant reason why labor market experiences vary so much by skill and marital status and their interaction, and why the labor market is so different after 2007 than it was before. 2007-2010 2007-2011 2007-2010 2007-2011 2,110 = 0.4 log points below median 9.7 6.2 -21.0 -12.8 2,578 = 0.2 log points below median 9.9 6.3 -21.4 -13.1 3,148 = median among working heads & spouses 9.5 6.1 -19.7 -12.2 3,845 = 0.2 log points above median 8.6 5.5 -16.6 -10.4 4,697 = 0.4 log points above median 6.6 3.9 -11.5 -6.7 2,110 = 0.4 log points below median 6.2 2.6 -11.0 -4.5 2,578 = 0.2 log points below median 7.1 3.4 -12.6 -5.8 3,148 = median among working heads & spouses 7.2 3.7 -12.6 -6.3 3,845 = 0.2 log points above median 6.6 3.5 -11.4 -5. 
